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Pierce & Mandell Lawyers to present at 2019 Yankee Dental Conference

Friday, October 05, 2018
Pierce & Mandell, P.C. - Bill MandellPierce & Mandell, P.C. - Hannah Schindler Spinelli

Bill Mandell and Hannah Schindler Spinelli of Pierce & Mandell, P.C. will be presenting a continuing education seminar entitled Legal Issues in Practice Transitions at the 2019 Yankee Dental Conference on Thursday, January 31, 2019 at 2:00pm.

The program will focus on the legal issues in the purchase and sale of practices and ownership in practices. Topics covered will include

  • What legal documents are necessary to buy or sell a practice and when to retain legal counsel?
  • What are the most important early steps to take to ensure that the transition will be successful?
  • How can buyers protect themselves from the liabilities of the seller?
  • How can sellers secure commitments for post-closing activities?
  • What are restrictive covenants and are enforceable, and how are they impacted under the new Massachusetts non-compete law?

For more information on the program see https://www.yankeedental.com/course?sfid=a181J000004TfduQAC.

To register for Yankee Dental go to https://www.yankeedental.com/.

Curt Dooling Prevails In Anti-Slapp Special Motion To Dismiss

Tuesday, July 31, 2018
Curtis B. Dooling

The Massachusetts anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute, G. L. c. 231, § 59H, authorizes a party sued because of his petitioning activity to file a special motion to dismiss within 60 days of service of the complaint. The purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute is to protect individuals from harassing litigation and from the burden of defending against retaliatory lawsuits.

In 2017, the SJC issued a decision, Blanchard v. Carney Hospital, 477 Mass. 141 (2017), that modified the anti-SLAPP legal analysis. In Blanchard, the SJC modified the Anti-SLAPP burden-shifting test by adding a second part to the analysis once the moving party makes a showing that the non-moving party’s claims are solely based on petitioning activity. Blanchard, 477 Mass. at 159-60. Under the pre-Blanchard test, the moving party had to first demonstrate that the nonmoving party’s claims were solely based on its own petitioning activity. Id. If the moving party met this initial burden, the non-moving party could defeat an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss by showing that the moving party’s petitioning activities were “sham petitioning.” Id.

In Blanchard, the SJC added a second prong to the burden shift on the nonmoving party. If the nonmoving party cannot show that the petitioning activity was a “sham” and was devoid of any reasonable basis in law or fact, the nonmoving party may defeat a special motion to dismiss by showing that the challenged claims were not primarily brought to chill legitimate petitioning activity.

Pierce & Mandell attorney Curt Dooling recently prevailed on an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss under the new Blanchard standard. The plaintiff filed suit against Pierce & Mandell’s client for statements they made before a FINRA arbitration panel and for seeking criminal complaints against the plaintiff. Dooling successfully argued that the claims had to be dismissed because they were based solely on valid, protected petitioning activity. The Superior Court allowed Pierce & Mandell’s special motion to dismiss and awarded costs and fees to Pierce & Mandell’s client.

Pierce & Mandell’s litigators have successfully litigated numerous anti-SLAPP cases and are well-versed in the latest case law.

"Massachusetts Real Estate Litigation” by P&M Shareholder Michael C. Fee

Monday, July 30, 2018
Michael C. Fee, Pierce & Mandell, P.C., Boston, MA

Pierce & Mandell shareholder Michael C. Fee has authored the recently published LexisNexis® Practice Guide to Massachusetts Real Estate Litigation (2018 Edition). The book is intended to offer practical guidance on some of the most significant real estate issues currently being litigated in Massachusetts, and contains nearly 400 practice tips, forms and checklists. Designed to be useful to both new and experienced practitioners, the guide strives to provide succinct, easily accessible yet comprehensive analysis in the following areas:

  • Adverse Possession
  • Trespass
  • Nuisance
  • Construction Liens
  • Public Works Bonding
  • Easements
  • Restrictive Covenants
  • Eminent Domain
  • Foreclosures
  • Real Property Receiverships
  • Residential and Commercial Landlord Tenant
  • Broker Litigation, and
  • Community Associations

For more information about “Massachusetts Real Estate Litigation (2018 Ed.)”, go here.

Pierce & Mandell, P.C. Hosts First Golf Clinic for Women

Friday, July 27, 2018

On July 12, 2018, Pierce & Mandell P.C. hosted clients, staff and friends of the firm at our first golf clinic for women at Tournament Players Club in Norton, Massachusetts.

Designed for both beginners and experienced players alike, the clinic featured three stations led by TPC professional staff. Each station (putting, chipping and full swing) afforded participants the opportunity to learn the rules and etiquette that revolve around that specific aspect of the game, as well as professional tips and individualized coaching.

The intention of the clinic was to create an environment for inexperienced players to learn the fundamentals of the game and become familiarized with different techniques, while more experienced golfers had the opportunity to refine the skills they had previously acquired. This allowed all participants the chance to further their interest in the game in a comfortable, and supportive team setting, serving also to integrate varying professionals from different walks of life.

Pierce & Mandell, P.C. hopes to host more of these clinics in the future.

Pierce & Mandell Lawyers and Staff Run “Lawyers Have Heart 5K” in Support of the American Heart Association

Wednesday, May 23, 2018

Pierce & Mandell Lawyers and Staff Run “Lawyers Have Heart 5K” in Support of the American Heart Association

Pierce & Mandell, P.C., Boston, MA

Lena Finnerty Wins Summary Judgment on Negligence Case

Monday, May 21, 2018

Lena Finnerty, Pierce & Mandell, P.C., Boston, MAPierce & Mandell attorney Lena Finnerty recently won summary judgment for the firm’s architect client in a case involving a slip and fall at a local federal government facility.

The firm represented an international architectural firm in a case involving a federal government employee who fell in the indoor “winter garden” of her employer’s large facility. Plaintiff alleged that she fell on pea stones that had migrated from the garden area onto the walking paths. The allegation against the firm’s client was that it was negligent in designing the winter garden by including pea stones as a feature.

The basis for the summary judgment motion was that plaintiff did not offer an expert witness to testify that designing the winter garden using pea stones violated the standard of care.

Founding partner Bob Pierce was lead counsel on the case for the architect, but Lena Finnerty wrote and argued the summary judgment motion. “I am so proud of Lena having developed this basis for a summary judgment motion and winning this dismissal for the client. This was tremendous work by Lena on behalf of the client and Pierce & Mandell.”

Pierce & Mandell is well known for defending every type of product liability, personal injury and construction defect case.

Bill Mandell was Quoted in the May 2018 ED Legal Letter Article

Monday, May 21, 2018

Pierce & William MandellBill Mandell was quoted in the May 2018 ED Legal Letter article on case law expanding ED’s legal exposure if discharged psychiatric patient commits violence.

A Cautionary Tale for Municipal Officials: The SJC clarifies the Open Meeting Law’s “deliberation exemption”

Thursday, May 17, 2018

Pierce and Mandell, P.C.By: Michael C. Fee

      The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s recent ruling in Boelter v. Board of Selectmen of Wayland (SJC-12353, April 5, 2018) interprets and clarifies, for the first time, the meaning of the term “deliberation,” which was added to the Open Meeting Law in July 2010. The Open Meeting Law requires that, with the exception of executive sessions, “all meetings of a public body shall be open to the public.” General Laws c. 30A, § 20 (a). The statute defines a “meeting” as “a deliberation by a public body with respect to any matter within the body’s jurisdiction,” subject to certain limited exclusions. G.L. c. 30A, § 18.

      A “deliberation,” is “an oral or written communication through any medium, including electronic mail, between or among a quorum of a public body on any public business within its jurisdiction.” The Open Meeting Law provides, however, that the term “deliberation” does not encompass the “distribution of a meeting agenda, scheduling information or distribution of other . . . reports or documents that may be discussed at a meeting, provided that no opinion of a member is expressed.” Id.

      While the importance of the Open Meeting Law cannot be understated, it is clear that the parameters it places on public officials are myriad and sometimes not entirely intuitive. Prior to the Legislature’s amendment of the statute in 2010, the Open Meeting Law defined “deliberation” as “a verbal exchange between a quorum of members of a governmental body attempting to arrive at a decision on any public business within its jurisdiction.” See G.L. c. 39, § 23A, as appearing in St. 1975, c. 303, § 3. The 2010 amendment broadened the law’s definition of “deliberation,” and affirmed that a “deliberation” could encompass “any medium,” not just verbal communication. At the same time, however, the Legislature made clear that public bodies could distribute materials internally in advance of public meetings without running afoul of the statute’s proscription on “deliberation.”

      In Boelter, the chair of the Wayland Select Board had circulated to all members, in advance of a public meeting where the town administrator’s evaluation was to take place, the members’ individual written evaluations of the town administrator’s performance, as well as a composite evaluation. At the meeting, the Board reviewed, discussed and approved the composite evaluation, and the meeting minutes memorialized that the Board “praised [the town administrator] for his availability and responsiveness to the public, his work ethic, his relationship with town staff, and his accessibility to board and committee members.” Both the composite and individual evaluations were only released to the public following the open meeting.

      The process followed by the Board was subsequently challenged, and plaintiffs argued that the public should have total access to the decision-making process whenever a town official is evaluated. See, e.g., School Comm. Of Wayland, 455 Mass. at 570 (“It is essential to a democratic form of government that the public have broad access to the decisions made by its elected officials and to the way in which the decisions are reached”). Upon review, the Boelter Court acknowledged that the exemption allowing distribution of some materials was likely in response to the practical realities of governmental service, and that by permitting officials to review certain administrative materials and reports in advance, the Legislature sought to enable the more efficient administration of public meetings. It also noted, however, that the overarching purpose of the Open Meeting Law is to ensure transparency in governmental decision-making, and the Legislature specifically outlawed the expression of opinions by board members in any documents circulated to a quorum prior to an open meeting. See Revere v. Massachusetts Gaming Comm’n, 476 Mass. 591, 610 (2017) (“the new version of the Open Meeting Law does not alter our belief that ‘[i]t is essential to a democratic form of government that the public have broad access to the decisions made by its elected officials and to the way in which the decisions are reached’” [citation omitted]).

      In parsing the Wayland Select Board’s actions, the Court took particular note that the materials privately distributed to the members contained “appraisals” of the Town manager’s performance. Although there was no conversation, there was nonetheless an exchange of “thoughts, impressions and conclusions” that was inconsistent with the Open Meeting Law’s requirement that all deliberations take place in public. The Court concluded that the effect of the circulation of the evaluations was that all five board members were aware of the opinions of the other four members in advance of the meeting. As a result, the circulation constituted a deliberation, or a meeting, to which the public did not have access.

      Noting that the Open Meeting Law was intended to ensure that the public is able to see for themselves how public decisions are made, See Revere, 476 Mass. at 610, the Court found that distribution of the individual and composite opinions to a quorum, prior to the meeting, violated the statute’s purpose. See G.L. c. 30A, § 18. Compare School Comm. Of Wayland, 455 Mass. at 570 (“Open meetings provide an opportunity for each member of the governmental body to debate the issues and disclose their personal viewpoints before the governmental body reaches its decision on a matter of public policy” (emphasis supplied); McCrea v. Flaherty, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 641 (2008) (Open Meeting Law “provides for public access to the decision-making process when it is in a formative stage, several steps removed from the eventual result”).

      The ruling in Boelter is both an affirmation of the Open Meeting Law’s overarching goal, transparency in governmental decision-making, and a challenge to public officials striving for administrative efficiency. The decision makes clear to municipal officials that there are now only two types of materials which may be safely distributed to a quorum outside of a public meeting: first, purely procedural or administrative materials (such as agendas), and second, reports or documents to be discussed at a later meeting, so long as such materials do not express the opinion of a board member. Careful municipal officials should consider adopting a general practice of not communicating by email at all except for distributing meeting agendas, scheduling meetings and distributing documents created by non-members to be discussed at meetings, all of which are ministerial tasks specifically sanctioned under the Open Meeting Law.

      Pierce & Mandell partner Michael C. Fee practices in the firm’s real estate and litigation departments. He is a former Town Moderator, Planning Board and Water District Chairman in Sudbury, and a current member of the Truro Open Space Committee. He frequently advises individuals and municipalities regarding public official liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Open Meeting Law, and matters involving public records, zoning, permitting, and land use.

Guidance to Massachusetts Health Care Providers Regarding the Release of Protected Health Information

Friday, May 04, 2018

By Curt Dooling, Matt Lauring and Bill Mandell

Hospitals and health care facilities, medical and other group practices, and individual clinicians regularly receive requests for patient records and information. It is often confusing for providers to determine when and under what circumstances they are permitted to disclose such records. Discovering parties can use the legal process to compel a response but cannot necessarily override applicable state privacy, confidentiality and privilege laws, as well as privacy rights under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), with a subpoena alone. HIPAA establishes minimum standards for the protection of protected health information (“PHI”) that do not preempt more protective state privacy laws and privileges. The following provides a brief overview on the differences between a court order, a subpoena, and an authorization for Massachusetts providers.

Subpoenas

Mass. R. Civ. P. 45 allows parties in civil lawsuits to subpoena records from non-parties. These subpoenas are often called keeper of records, or KOR, subpoenas. They are also sometimes referred to as a subpoena duces tecum.

Parties receiving a subpoena must respond to the subpoena within a certain referenced time frame. However, as a general rule, medical records should not be automatically produced in response to a subpoena, without first confirming if there is sufficient authority to release the PHI under both Massachusetts law and HIPAA. Such authority could be (i) under statutory authority on the subpoena alone if certain conditions are met, or (ii) with an executed HIPAA compliant patient authorization, or (ii) upon the issuance of a proper court order.

Subpoenas are not court orders. Subpoenas are issued by attorneys to obtain documents. Attorneys do not need a court’s permission to issue a subpoena. Medical providers can mistake subpoenas for court orders given that subpoenas are often served by a sheriff or constable, are notarized and look like an official court document. Thus, while a timely response must be sent back by the provider to the discovering party, that response may have to be in the form of an objection letter seeking the additional needed authority to disclose the PHI.

Massachusetts licensed hospitals and clinics (but not unlicensed practices) may produce medical records in response to a subpoena alone pursuant to G. L. c 111, § 70, but only if the patient is a named party in the case.

Similarly, under HIPAA’s privacy rule, 45 CFR 164.512(e)(1)(ii), a covered entity that is not a party to the litigation may disclose protected health information in response to a subpoena, discovery request, or other lawful process if the covered entity receives certain satisfactory assurances from the party seeking the information. Specifically, the covered entity must receive a written statement and accompanying documentation that the requesting party has made reasonable efforts either (1) to ensure that the individual who is the subject of the information has been given sufficient notice of the request, or (2) to secure a qualified protective order.

Thus, when viewing G. L. 111, § 70 in combination with 45 CFR 164.512(e)(1)(ii), a hospital or clinic may release confidential medical records in response to a subpoena alone if the patient is named in the caption and the provider receives assurance that the patient has been given notice that the records have been requested and has not objected. However, G. L. 111, § 70 only applies to hospitals or clinics licensed by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health. Therefore, medical practices and other groups may not release PHI in response to a subpoena without first securing a HIPAA compliant authorization from the patient, or a proper judicial order.

Additionally Protected Information

HIPAA provides a minimum level of protection for the disclosure and protection of an individual’s PHI. However, HIPAA expressly permits states to enact laws and regulations that provide more safeguards for the protection of patient information and records

Massachusetts has several statutes that provide additional protections for certain health information. For example:

  • General Laws c. 112, § 135B provides for the confidentiality of patient/social worker communications. Pursuant to G. L. c. 112, § 135B, social worker communications and records are privileged and may only be disclosed under certain circumstances.
  • General Laws c. 233, § 20B provides for the confidentiality of patient/psychotherapist communications. Pursuant to G. L. c. 233, § 20B, psychotherapist communications and records are privileged and may only be disclosed under certain circumstances.
  • General Laws c. 111, § 70F provides for the confidentiality of a patient’s HIV testing records. Pursuant to G. L. c. 111, § 70F, HIV testing records may only be disclosed with a patient’s express consent.
  • General Laws c. 233, § 20J provides for the confidentiality of sexual assault counselor communications. Pursuant to G. L. c. 233, § 20J, sexual assault counselor communications are privileged and may only be disclosed under certain circumstances.

These are only some examples of Massachusetts statutes that provide additional protection to certain medical records. There are other additionally protected categories of information under both federal and state law for substance treatment records, alcohol blood test results and minor records, to name others.

Authorizations

If a patient signs a HIPAA-compliant written authorization, a medical provider may release protected health information, as well as additionally protected areas that are explicitly referenced and designated by the patient for release. A HIPAA-compliant authorization form must include the following elements:

  • A description of the information to be disclosed;
  • The name of the individual or the name of the person authorized to make the requested disclosure;
  • The name or other identification of the recipient of the information;
  • A description of each purpose of the disclosure;
  • An expiration date or an expiration event that relates to the individual;
  • A signature of the individual or their personal representative (someone authorized to make health care decisions on behalf of the individual) and the date.

A disclosure for the release of additionally protected information should specifically state which additionally protected records are to be released.

Court Orders

A court order is a mandate issued by a court, a judge, magistrate or a clerk of the court requiring or forbidding someone to do something pursuant to the order. If privileged, additionally protected information is contained in the medical record, in lieu of an authorization, the court order is to be reviewed carefully and only that information which it orders produced is to be produced. It is not necessary to explain that other documents are not being produced in response to a court order if you are following the terms of the order. The judicial order must specify the type of record that is ordered to be released.

Medical providers should adopt health information policies and protocols to follow when a subpoena is served seeking production of a patient’s medical records. Navigating the requirements for the protection of PHI and the authorized release of PHI is difficult and complex. Pierce & Mandell’s health law attorneys have extensive experiencing advising medical providers on HIPAA compliance issues and medical record issues.

Complexities in the Division or Sale of Multiple Parcels in Partition Proceedings

Monday, April 30, 2018

Michael C. Fee, Pierce & Mandell, P.C., Boston, MABy: Michael C. Fee

Petitions to Partition, often brought in the Land or Probate Courts, allow the division of land owned by two or more individuals. The right to partition is absolute, and does not require the consent of other co-owners. For an excellent overview of general partition principles and practice, see Jeff Angley’s primer entitled "Partition of Land".

The process of partition becomes complex when the land to be divided consists of multiple parcels. While courts strive to balance the rights and equities of the parties in partition proceedings, Schore v. Johnson, Land Court Misc. Case No. 29096, July 14, 2008 (Piper, J.), quoting Gonzalez v. Pierce-Williams, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 785, 787 (2007), and Moat v. Ducharme, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 749, 751 (1990), in cases where multiple parcels are involved generally “division in kind” becomes the favored method of partition, i.e. awarding parcels of equal value to each party. However, a court may also order sale of all of the parcels and equitable division of the proceeds when it determines that the land cannot be divided “advantageously.” G.L. c. 241, § 31. Delta Materials Corp. v. Bagdon, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 333 (1992) and Buell v. Rubin, Land Court Misc. Case No. 310497, November 9, 2005 (Long, J.).

The General Rule

The proposition that the “primary” method of partition is by division derives principally from historical cases involving homogenous parcels where an equitable result could be derived from simple subdivision. For example, in Mello v. Mello, 322 Mass. 69 (1947), the SJC noted:

The primary method of partition is by division of the land itself by mete and bounds among the tenants in common. Until St. 1870, c. 257, and St. 1871, c. 111, § 1, later Pub. Sts. (1882) c. 178, § 65, a sale for the purpose of partition could not be ordered. Ramsey v. Humphrey, 162 Mass. 385, 386. Clough v. Cromwell, 250 Mass. 324, 330, 331. The existing statute intimates that sale may be ordered only of land "which cannot be divided advantageously." G. L. c. 241, § 31. See also § 6.

Similarly, in Buckley v. Lombard, Land Court Misc. Case No. 306156, November 30, 2007 (Scheier, J.), the Court recognized that “division in kind, or on the land, is the favored method of partition,” Id. at 7), but only after the court determines “by a preponderance of the whole evidence that the land cannot be advantageously divided before ordering a sale.” Id. at 7, citing Delta Materials Corp. at 338 (further citations omitted). In Buckley, the Court expressly recognized that G.L. c. 241, § 311 (the statutory provision authorizing sale) must be read in conjunction with G.L. c. 241, § 142, “which further instructs the Court to consider whether the land may be divided or set-off to one co-tenant without ‘great inconvenience’ to the co-owners.”

The Meaning of Statutory Terms “Inconvenience” and “Disadvantage”

What constitutes “inconvenience” or “disadvantage” has been addressed by several courts, with the inquiry focused squarely on conditions that create pecuniary inequities. For example, in Heald v. Kinnard, 180 Mass. 521, 523 (1902), the court struggled with the partition of a cranberry bog, which because of the particular way in which water flowed through the parcel, could not be divided such that each party would receive equal value. The Court observed:

In this case the advantageousness of the division was in part a question of market values, and from this point of view we are of opinion that the judge was warranted in considering the de facto condition of the premises.

Id. at 523. Although the Heald Court analyzed in depth the physical attributes of the land and the resulting options for division in kind, the key factor in determining “disadvantage” was whether division would result in a loss of value or money to a party:

The considerations which determine whether land can be divided advantageously no doubt have reference mainly to the physical conditions of the land to be divided, but the advantage or disadvantage generally must be pecuniary. Citing Vesper v. Farnsworth, 40 Wis. 357, 361, 362.

Similarly, in Clough v. Cromwell, 254 Mass. 132 (1925), a case involving parcels of land held by tenants in common on Martha’s Vineyard, the evidence established that the majority of value for the entire property was attributable to shooting privileges, and as a result the trial court found that the parties’ interests were best served by a sale of all of the land. The SJC affirmed, and relied on Heald for the proposition that the court had broad discretion to determine whether division would result in pecuniary disadvantage or monetary loss to any of the parties:

If a division by partition of the different parcels would cause great damage and loss to the owners, as the judge has found, we cannot say that he was not amply justified in ordering a sale of all of the lands, and a division of the proceeds in proper proportions.

Id. at 137.

Also instructive is the ruling Buckley v. Lombard, a Land Court case involving a partition petition for a small lot in Wellfleet, where the respondent urged division in kind to enable her to retain a right to access beach property. Citing Delta Materials Corp. and Clough v. Cromwell, Judge Scheier noted that G.L. c. 241, § 31 instructs the court to direct its inquiry “mainly to the physical conditions of the land to be divided, but the advantage or disadvantage must be pecuniary.” Id. at 9 citing Clough v. Cromwell at 332-33. The court next evaluated G.L. c. 241, § 31 in conjunction with § 14, which requires determination regarding whether division in kind could be accomplished without “great inconvenience,” and subsequently rejected the respondent’s “personal and subjective view of the value of locus” as “not the type of retained value that the partition statute contemplates.” Id.

As Buckley, Clough and Heald make clear, paramount in the Court’s analysis as to whether it can divide multiple parcels is the central determination of whether one party or another will suffer a loss of value or money as a result of a division. If such case, courts may conclude that the property cannot be “advantageously divided” and a sale of all parcels, and equitable distribution of the proceeds, is likely to follow.

The Concept of Owelty

Also critical are the provisions of G.L. c. 241, § 14 which provide that “[I]f all the land cannot be divided without such inconvenience, the whole or any part thereof may be set off to any one or more of the parties, with his or her consent, upon payment by him or them to any one or more of the others of such amounts of money as the Commissioners award to make the partition just and equal.” The statute envisions a partition resolution whereby willing owners agree to a division in kind that, although inconvenient, is acceptable. In cases where a division in kind will result in a loss of value because the parcels sold collectively are worth more than the sum of their parts, such “disadvantage” or “inconvenience” will often prohibit division unless the parties consent.

The concept of owelty in partition jurisprudence is ancient, and the principle that a party may not be forced to pay sums of money in order to establish equity in a partition proceeding has endured. In Hodges v. Pingree, 76 Mass. 14 (1857), the Supreme Judicial Court held that in partition, if the premises cannot be divided without damage to the owners, “the whole estate may be set off to any one of the parties who will accept it by paying such sums of money by way of owelty as may be awarded by the commissioners.” Id. at 15. Today, the concept of consent to owelty remains explicit in G.L. c. 241, § 14 and is often a critical component of any division of multiple, diverse parcels.

When multiple parcels are involved, partition proceedings can become complex, time consuming and costly. Experienced legal advice is essential to any party contemplating or involved in partition. Pierce & Mandell partner Michael C. Fee is a member of the firm’s real estate and litigation practice groups and represents clients in all forms of real estate litigation, including petitions to partition.

1G.L. c. 241, § 31 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

In partition proceedings, the court may order the commissioners to sell and convey the whole or any part of the land which cannot be divided advantageously, upon such terms and conditions and with such securities for the proceeds of the sale as the court may order, and to distribute the proceeds so as to make the partition just and equal.

2G.L. c. 241, § 14 provides as follows:

If a part of the land cannot be divided without great inconvenience to the owners, or is of greater value than the share of any party, or if all the land cannot be divided without such inconvenience, the whole or any part thereof may be set off to any one or more of the parties, with his or their consent, upon payment by him or them to any one or more of the others of such amounts of money as the commissioners award to make the partition just and equal.


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